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Executive summary 
The shadow economy in Moldova represents more than 44% of GDP whereas in Slovakia it is only 17%. 
To help Moldovan experts and policy makers, this study reviews key causes of the shadow economy and 
explores the ways how to reduce it including the World Bank recommendations and the best Slovak 
experience. Among the causes, the most important are high taxes for people with low income, low risk of 
detection, low social capital and trust to the government, and more generally, poor quality of the 
business environment. Reducing tax burden (including social insurance contributions) for low-earners 
belongs to the top priority measures especially in countries with low formal income, i.e. where the risk of 
absolute poverty is higher. The “minijobs” introduced under the Hartz IV reform in Germany might be 
inspiring: Monthly wages less than €400 are not subject to social insurance contributions and for 
monthly incomes between €401 and €800, the contribution rate rises gradually to the full share.  
Among other recommendations, Moldova should take inspiration from the Slovak tax reform which 
radically simplified the tax system. It should also initiate cooperation with the OECD and the World Bank 
and compute key indicators influencing motivation of people to go informal: productivity of social 
insurance, Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) index, tax wedge, formalization tax rate, and 
marginal effective tax rate. Based on the results, Moldova should introduce measures aimed at 
improving these indicators. The Slovak Labor market reform shows that to create more legal jobs, it is 
essential to keep low costs of dismissing employees and to support flexible forms of employment. This is 
true especially for seasonally sensitive sectors such as agriculture which creates around 16% of 
Moldovan GDP and employs more than 27% of employees. However, even good rules may not work if 
there is low level of social capital and weak institutions. Therefore, Moldova should build its social 
capital, trust to politicians and government institutions. This is a long lasting process that requires 
increasing transparency in public spending, fighting corruption, and improving the quality of institutions 
and public benefits. 
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1. Shadow economy – definition and structure 
The shadow economy is often referred to also as a „grey market“, or an „informal economy“. It should 
be distinguished from the “black economy” which means naturally illegal activities such as crime or 
producing and distributing drugs. On contrary, the “informal economy”, as defined by Wikipedia, is “part 
of an (otherwise legal) economy that is not taxed, monitored by any form of government, or included in 
any gross national product (GNP), unlike the formal economy.” Here are some other definitions of the 
shadow economy:  
• Schneider (2010): (Naturally) legal activities hidden deliberately from public authorities 
• BusinessDictionary.com: The part of an economy involving goods and services which are paid for 
in cash, and therefore not declared for tax 
• OECD Glossary of Statistical Terms: Underground production consists of activities that are 
productive in an economic sense and quite legal (provided certain standards or regulations are 
complied with), but which are deliberately concealed from public authorities for the following 
reasons: 
a. to avoid the payment of income, value added or other taxes; 
b. to avoid payment of social security contributions; 
c. to avoid meeting certain legal standards such as minimum wages, maximum hours, 
safety or health standards, etc; 
d. to avoid complying with certain administrative procedures, such as completing statistical 
questionnaires or other administrative forms. 
According to Schneider (2010) around 2/3 of the „shadow“ income is spent in the official economy. 
Therefore the question might arise whether it is good or bad to have a shadow economy. On positive 
side, the evidence shows that the shadow economy works as a buffer between unemployment and 
regular employment. It is a sort of social safety net that may increase economic output. On the other 
hand there are strong arguments against. It usually means less income security for “shadow” workers, 
lack of legal rights, lack of access to the public health care, low future public pension, underfinanced 
public goods, and competition distortion (free riding) – see Chapter 3 for more detail. As shown in the 
following figure, the evolution teaches us that the official economies beat the shadow ones. 
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Figure 1: The shadow economy as a percentage of recorded GDP, various countries, 2007 
 
Source: Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro (2010); Jurzyca (2012) 
Schneider (2010) identifies two types of the shadow economy. Around 1/3 is created by underreporting 
of profits – undeclared transactions in Business-to-Business (B2B) and Business-to-Consumer (B2C) 
relations. Around 2/3 is created by undeclared work – workers paid „under the table“. In most sectors, 
employing of undeclared workers prevails. However, underreporting of profits is most frequent in 
wholesale and retail, transport and communication, hotels and restaurants. 
 
Figure 2: Structure of the shadow economy 
 
Source: Schneider (2010) 
Because it is undeclared, there are specific problems with measuring the extent of the shadow economy. 
In most respected studies it is measured by a combination of direct methods such as statistical surveys 
asking about direct experience of respondents and indirect methods such as comparing national 
accounts with electricity consumption, or measuring the use of cash transactions. Widely respected 
research on the extent of the shadow economy was developed by Friedrich Schneider from the Johannes 
Kepler University in Linz, Austria. In Figure 3, we show that according to his model, the shadow economy 
is mostly spread in the Eastern Europe (e.g. 33% of GDP in Bulgaria), less in southern Europe (e.g. 25% of 
GDP in Greece) and the least in Western Europe (e.g. 18% of GDP in Belgium). However there are 
substantial differences among countries in particular region. For example in the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia the shadow economy represents only 17% of GDP, but in Spain and Portugal it is 20% of GDP 
and in Austria and Switzerland it is only 8% of GDP.  
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According to Schneider, Buehn, and Montenegro (2010) the shadow economy in Moldova represented 
44.3% of GDP in 2006 which was 135th position from among 165 countries. Only Ukraine (46.8%) and 
Georgia (62.1%) had higher rates from among transition countries. 
Figure 3: Shadow economy in Europe 
 
Source: Schneider (2010) 
Schneider found great differences in the extent of the shadow economy among various economic 
sectors. For a given set of countries (Germany, Italy, Spain, Poland, Romania, and Turkey) it is mostly 
spread in construction, wholesale and retail trade, manufacturing, hotels and restaurants, transportation 
and agriculture. On contrary it is almost nonexistent in mining, electricity and financial services. 
Figure 4: Shadow economy in sectors 
 
Source: Schneider (2010)  
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2. Causes of the shadow economy 
In the Eurobarometer survey from 2007, respondents identified four primary reasons for doing 
undeclared work. Most frequently their answer was “too low salaries” and “too high taxes”. These two 
reasons probably relate to each other because some people may consider their salary to low because 
they have to pay too high taxes. It shows that the tax system plays major role in deciding whether to 
declare or not to declare. Among other reasons “lack of control by authorities” plays important role in 
several countries such as Bulgaria, Greece, Cyprus, and the Czech Republic. The fourth examined reason 
was a “lack of regular jobs” which was frequently pointed out in Austria, Slovakia, Italy, or Slovenia. 
Figure 5: What, in your opinion, are the primary reasons for doing undeclared work? 
 
Source: Leibfritz (2011) based on “Undeclared Work in the European Union”, Eurobarometer survey, October 2007 
Schneider (2010) identifies four key causes of the shadow economy:  
1. High tax burden 
2. Lack of „guilty conscience“: Shadow economy is considered to be normal usually if there is low 
quality of state institutions and benefits 
3. High spread of cash payments   
4. Low risk of detection: It depends on effectiveness of control and penalties 
Compared to the Eurobarometer survey, besides taxes and repression, this list includes “quality of state 
institutions and benefits” and “spread of cash payments” among key causes of the shadow economy. 
The logic is straightforward. If people do not trust government institutions, for example because they 
perceive high corruption in the government, they feel less guilty if they or their neighbors and trading 
partners avoid paying taxes. Similarly, if people do not get sufficient value in benefits offered by the 
state they are less willing to pay taxes. It is also easier to hide cash transactions than electronic 
payments.  
As shown in Figure 6, there is a strong negative correlation between government effectiveness and the 
shadow economy. In other words, the shadow economy is bigger in countries with weak governance and 
weak institutional credibility. 
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Figure 6: Shadow economy and its correlation with government quality 
 
World Bank (2012) 
Similarly, as shown in Figure 7, there is a strong negative correlation between frequency of electronic 
payments and the shadow economy. In other words, the size of the shadow economy is bigger in 
countries where people use less electronic payments. 
Figure 7: Shadow economy and its correlation with electronic payments 
 
Source: Schneider (2010)  
As described in the World Bank (2012) study, from more general perspective, the shadow economy is 
caused by a wider spectrum of barriers to healthy business environment. This may include tax 
regulations and administration, flexibility of labor market regulations, administrative burden on 
businesses or corruption incidence. As we can see from international rankings measuring quality of 
business environment, Moldova is lagging behind particularly in economic freedom and corruption 
perception. 
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Table 1: International rankings – Moldova compared to selected countries 
 Economic 
Freedom 
Index, 2012 
Corruption 
Perception 
Index, 2011 
Doing Business, 
2013 
World 
Competitiveness 
Report, 2012-13 
Shadow Economy 
Index, 2000-07 
Moldova 124. 112. 83. 87. 135. 
Romania 62. 75. 72. 78. 77. 
Slovakia 51. 66. 46. 71. 25. 
Germany 26. 14. 20. 6. 18. 
USA 10. 24. 4. 7. 2. 
Source: Heritage 
Foundation 
Transparency 
International 
World Bank World Economic 
Forum 
Schneider, Buehn, 
Montenegro 
 
According to the World Competitiveness Report 2012-13, the businesses in Moldova mention corruption 
as the most problematic factor for doing business, tax regulations are the 6th most problematic factor.  
Figure 8: Businesses mention corruption as the biggest barrier in Moldova 
 
Source: World Competitiveness Report 2012-13  
The Gallup WorldView survey shows that Moldovans perceive relatively high corruption in government 
and have relatively low confidence in police and judicial system. They also perceive low quality of 
healthcare as well as roads and highways. On the other hand Moldovans have relatively higher 
confidence in their education system and public transportation. 
Table 2: Trust to government in Moldova and selected countries (data taken in the fall of 2012) 
 
Moldova Romania Slovakia Germany USA 
Confidence in police 36% 55% 62% 82% 79% 
Confidence in judicial system 27% 24% 34% 61% 48% 
Confidence in government 24% 12% 28% 42% 35% 
Quality of healthcare 43% 38% 63% 91% 73% 
Educational system 54% 54% 62% 66% 64% 
Honesty of elections 31% 17% 50% 62% 42% 
Corruption in government 81% 87% 78% 63% 73% 
Roads and highways 17% 36% 35% 77% 66% 
Public transportation 55% 61% 59% 67% 61% 
Source: Gallup WorldView 
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The World Bank (2012) study suggests that the firms in the EU new member states and Croatia 
considered tax rates the main obstacle to doing business. Among other important obstacles they quoted 
corruption and tax administration. 
Figure 9: Obstacles to doing business 
 
Source: World Bank (2012) 
Note: Factors mostly relevant to the shadow economy are marked with the yellow color.  
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3. How to fight against shadow economy 
 
3.1. Principles 
As mentioned in the first chapter around 2/3 of the “shadow” income is spent in official economy. It is a 
sort of social safety net that may increase economic output. According to the World Bank (2012), there is 
certain pattern of how the shadow economy reacts to the economic cycles. If the economy is growing, 
people move from unemployment to both regular and informal employment. Interestingly, there is no 
clear pattern about moving from informal to formal employment. It probably depends on other factors 
such as rules, repression, and social capital. On the other hand, if the economy falls into recession, the 
informal employment falls if unemployment rises – informal workers get unemployed. 
Moreover, according to the World Bank (2012), it is people with low-paying and casual part-time jobs 
who are mostly involved in the shadow market. This makes fight against the shadow economy little 
tricky. If you wipe it out you might end up with disappearing small jobs and hurting the weakest. And you 
might slow down your economic growth. 
But the negatives of the shadow market are also obvious. The World Bank (2012) warns against them: 
• At the household level workers and families are unable to properly manage their income risks 
because they have no formal access to social security.  
• Businesses that operate outside regulation lack access to credit and to protection of property 
rights while formal companies are overburdened due to tax revenue losses and unfair 
competition from informal firms. 
• At the societal level, a large informal sector erodes the financing of public goods and services, 
thereby inhibiting the government’s capacity to provide proper education and health care 
services and a well-functioning infrastructure. 
The World Bank (2012) also says that the governments in Eastern Europe cannot afford a large shadow 
economy, neither in the short run due to fiscal concerns, nor in the long run due to the shrinking labor 
force caused by aging. The shadow economy in Eastern Europe is so widespread that it risks undermining 
the region's long-term growth potential. The ongoing financial crisis has created a "renewed sense of 
urgency" to end the practice of untaxed and unregulated work. 
Based on these observations, we propose several principles in fight against shadow economy: 
1. Take gradual approach: Being IN is better than being SHADOW, but being SHADOW is better than 
being OUT; speed and scope of shadow economy decrease has its optimum.  
2. Take care of right order: Hard regulation should come after good rules are applied. With bad 
rules for example due to high tax/administrative burden there is a strong motivation of people 
with low income to stay informal. If you fight shadow economy with repression and you have 
bad rules, you risk harming the economy; they might get unemployed. Moreover, there is usually 
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limited repression with bad rules because it is politically inconvenient to punish low-earners. As a 
consequence, there is more room for rich free-riders and the damage to the economy is bigger. 
3. Build social capital: It is important to apply measures aimed at increasing transparency and fight 
against corruption. Even good rules may not work if there is low level of social capital and 
weak institutions. 
 
3.2. Structural incentives 
Choosing right rules means choosing right incentives for people to stay in the official market; in 
literature, these rules are also referred to as „structural incentives”. The World Bank (2012) identifies 
following key structural incentives: 
• Tax system: 
– Tax burden: Tax wedge, Formalization tax rate (FTR), Marginal effective tax rate (METR) 
– Tax mix: Structure of labor, capital, consumption, and real estate taxes 
– Tax administration (capacity, complexity, corruption) 
• Income-dependent social benefits 
• Labor market: 
– Employment protection (e.g. restrictions on dismissal) 
– Active and passive interventions 
– Labor Union power, Minimum wage 
• Link between contributions (social insurance) and benefits 
• Bureaucracy, market competition, etc. 
Tax system 
According to the World Bank (2012), the high taxes on labor especially at low earnings are among key 
causes of the shadow economy in Central and Eastern Europe. This is mainly due to high social insurance 
contributions. With too high taxes, the firms and workers often face trade-off between compliance and 
survival. This problem is even more serious in poorer countries. As Leibfritz (2011) explains:  
“Relatively low formal salaries, together with relatively high taxes on labor, may explain why in the new 
members of the EU undeclared work often takes the form of under-declaration of income through 
payment of part of registered workers’ wages in cash or through false registration of workers as self-
employed.” 
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The formal employment does not decline if people under-declare their income, but the government 
revenues are lower. 
The tax system may inflate shadow economy also in other ways:  
• A combination of high taxes on labor and low taxes on capital can induce individuals to 
transform labor income into capital income to reduce their tax burden. 
• Where the effective tax burden is lower for the self-employed than for dependent workers, 
workers may shift—voluntarily or coerced by employers—from dependent employment to self-
employment. 
• The tax treatment of families may encourage secondary earners to work informally if additional 
formal income is taxed at a high marginal rate. 
• Ineffective tax administration (complexity, corruption) discourages people to declare taxes. As 
shown in Table 3, Moldova ranks number 109 out of 185 economies in the ease of paying taxes 
indicator computed by the World Bank Doing Business report. It has rather low tax rates but it 
lags behind in number of tax payments and total time to comply with tax duties. 
Table 3: Ease of paying taxes 
 Moldova Romania Slovakia Germany USA 
Ranking 109. 136. 100. 72. 69. 
Payments (number per year) 48 41 20 9 11 
Time (hours per year) 220 216 207 207 175 
Total tax rate (% of proﬁt) 31.2 44.2 47.9 46.8 46.7 
Source: WB Doing Business 2013 
As mentioned above, high social insurance contributions especially for people with low income is a key 
barrier to enter legal employment and declare taxes. It is useful to compute “productivity of social 
insurance contributions” to find out how serious is this problem in particular country. The indicator is 
computed as a percentage of social insurance contributions of GDP (it means real money that is 
collected) divided by a percentage of total rate of social insurance contributions (it means nominal rate 
that should be paid). The hypothesis is that the higher is the result, the less people avoid paying social 
insurance contributions. This is true theoretically, but to be precise one should take into account also 
differences in the bases of social insurance contributions. However, as shown in Figure 10, according to 
this simplified calculation, Romania, Bulgaria and Slovakia belong to countries with the lowest discipline 
in paying social insurance contributions. The differences among countries are huge. For example it is 
alarming to see that Estonia with total social insurance rate of 33% raises 12.6% of GDP, but Romania 
with rate of 52% raises only 10.3% of GDP.  
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Figure 10: Productivity of social insurance contributions for selected countries, 2008 
 
Source: World Bank (2012) 
The tax wedge is used to measure how much of personal income is taken away by state institutions. It is 
defined as a difference between labor costs and the take-home pay of workers: 
Tax wedge = (Social insurance contributions paid by employers and employees + Personal income tax 
paid by employees) / (Total labor costs) 
Box 1: Taxation of individuals in Moldova, as of 2009 
 
 Two progressive Personal income tax (“PIT”) rates: 
o 7% for annual income up to MDL 25,200 (around EUR 1,669) 
o 18% for annual income that exceeds MDL 25,200 (around EUR 1,669)  
 Personal exemption for resident individuals is of MDL 7,200 (EUR 477) per year 
 Income from any professional or entrepreneurial activity is taxed by 0% for the private 
entrepreneurs and farming enterprises 
 The social security contribution rate for employees is 6%, while the rate due by Moldovan employers 
is 23% 
 The 6% employee social security contribution rate is applied to a base capped at five times the 
national average salary for the year, i.e. MDL 15,700 (approximately EUR 1,040) 
 Health insurance contributions rates are 3.5%, both at the level of employers and of employees 
 
Source: PwC (2009) 
The tax wedge usually depends on family type (single/couple, number of children), type of earnings (e.g. 
employment, self-employment) and wage level. According to the World Bank (2012), labor taxation is 
higher for low-wage earners in the EU new member states. For example, for a single person with no 
children who receives a gross wage 33 percent of the average wage, only a few EU-15 countries—
including Sweden, Germany, Belgium, and Finland—charge higher taxes than most of the EU’s new 
member states. 
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Figure 11: Tax wedge for low-earners in selected countries 
 
Source: World Bank (2012) 
It is important to compute also tax wedge progressivity; it means how the tax wedge changes, as the 
income rises. As shown in Figure 12, in Estonia and Latvia, the tax wedge for low-wage earners is higher 
than in Australia or the United Kingdom. Typically, people with low income pay lower taxes in Anglo-
Saxon countries compared to continental European countries. It is probably no coincidence that the 
Anglo-Saxon countries have usually low unemployment and small shadow economies.  
Figure 12: Tax wedge progressivity in selected countries 
 
Source: World Bank (2012) 
Compared to the tax wedge, the formalization tax rate (FTR) offers more exact information about 
motivations of people to switch from the informal to the formal economy. It is mainly because it involves 
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both labor taxes and income related social benefits. The FTR is defined as a share of informal income 
that an informal worker has to give up to formalize: 
FTR = [Informal income (informal wage + social benefits) - Formal net income (formal net wage + social 
benefits)] / Informal income 
For individual, turning from informal to formal employment means: 
• Loss of tax wedge 
• (At least partial) Loss of income-tested benefits: Social assistance, housing benefits, in-work and 
family benefits 
• Gain of social insurance benefits: Old-age and disability pension, health insurance, 
unemployment and sickness benefits, employment protection, etc. 
Similarly to the tax wedges comparisons, the Anglo-Saxon countries usually have lower FTR compared 
the continental European countries. For example, according to the World Bank (2012) study, for low-
wage earners, the opportunity costs of formal work are higher in Bulgaria and Romania than in Australia 
and the United States. More specifically, in Bulgaria, single persons with no children who earn less than 
the minimum wage in the informal sector have to give up from 50% to 70% of their income to formalize 
whereas in the USA they have to give up less than 35% of their income. 
Figure 13: FTR in selected countries 
 
Source: World Bank (2012) 
As displayed in Figure 14, the post-communist countries usually have highest FTR (peaks) at lower wage 
levels. It means that low-earning people in these countries face the biggest financial barrier to enter the 
formal market. For example in Romania single people without children with income less than 10% of 
average wage have to give up almost 70% of their informal income to formalize, in Serbia they have to 
give up even more that 80%. In Australia, the peak is at 40% for people who earn more than 40% of the 
average wage. 
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Figure 14: FTR peaks 
 
Source: World Bank (2012) 
It is necessary to compute marginal effective tax rate (METR) to get a complete picture about how the 
tax rates and social benefits influence motivation of people to stay in formal economy. The METR 
measures, at a given wage level, how much of an additional euro earned in formal gross wages is taxed 
away, either as labor tax or in the form of withdrawn benefits. Thus, it is an indication of how much it 
pays for workers to earn more gross income, either by increasing work hours or receiving higher wages. 
As shown in Figure 15, according to the World Bank (2012), the new EU members tend to have high 
METRs—usually 100 percent—at low wage levels. For example, in the Czech Republic and Slovenia, every 
additional euro earned in formal income is 100% taxed away through withdrawal of social assistance at 
wage levels below 20% of the average wage. In Portugal, it is only 50% and in the US it is even less. 
Figure 15: METR in selected countries 
 
Source: World Bank (2012) 
Conclusion: According to the World Bank (2012), the regression analysis on microdata shows that the 
levels of both the FTR and METR have a strongly significant, positive correlation with the probability that 
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a worker is engaged informally. In other words, greater individual disincentives to formal work (as 
measured by FTR and METR) correlate strongly with higher probabilities of being informal. Of course, 
correlation says nothing about causality. 
Employment protection 
One of the most complex indicators of labor law flexibility is the Employment Protection Legislation 
Index computed by the OECD. It is a composite of three indicators: (1) Protection of permanent workers 
against individual dismissal, (2) specific requirements for collective dismissal, and (3) regulations on 
temporary forms of employment. 
Figure 16: Employment protection in OECD and selected non-OECD countries 
 
Source: World Bank (2012) 
Contribution-benefit link 
The strong contribution-benefit link means that the higher contributions you pay the higher benefits you 
receive. Typical example is a public pension. If you have to pay more money to the state pension fund 
and you get proportionally higher pension, you have high motivation to declare your income. On 
contrary, if you have to pay a lot, but you receive disproportionally little pension, you search for ways 
how to avoid mandatory payments. As the World Bank (2012) notices, the effect of strengthening the 
link depends critically on whether workers perceive the link between contributions today and benefits 
far in the future to be strong and credible. It means this effect depends on the credibility of institutions. 
The World Bank (2012) emphasizes that the health insurance is the most important from among social 
insurance entitlements in regard of their influence on informal economy. The reason is that people feel 
immediate threat of falling sick in contrast for example to distant pension promises. Therefore, an easy 
access to free health insurance (e.g. paid by state) decreases motivation to work formally. Hence two 
recommendations: 
• Entitlements to free health insurance should be (1) limited to the poor and (2) based on a means 
test, not an income test nor a formal employment status (such as registered unemployment). 
• States should build robust means-testing mechanisms (or their proxies, e.g. based on electricity 
consumption, or frequent contact with a social worker).  
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3.3. Specific measures including the best Slovak experience 
The following text offers several reform examples of how particular countries improved structural 
incentives in their tax system and labor market legislation: 
Germany Hartz IV reform in effect from early 2000s (Source: World Bank, 2012): The reform introduced 
“minijobs” – monthly wages less than €400 are not subject to social insurance contributions. For monthly 
incomes between €401 and €800, the contribution rate rises gradually to the full share. 
USA: Refundable tax credits (source: World Bank, 2012): The “earned income credit” and the “making 
work pay” credit are available to low-wage earners and their families. For a U.S. taxpayer with one child, 
34 percent of earned income up to US$9,000 is refundable, which amounts to the equivalent of a cash 
benefit of about US$3,000. This refundable credit is phased out at incomes above US$16,000. Similar 
benefits are available for other family types and single persons earning low incomes. 
Denmark’s renowned “flexicurity” model (Source: World Bank, 2012): The word “flexicurity” was 
created by mixing the words “flexibility” and “security”. The logic behind is that the reform increased 
flexibility in hiring and firing workers and at the same time increased security of people who lost 
employment. In other words, the reform shifted protection away from jobs to the people who lose 
employment by shifting the financial burden from businesses to the state. For businesses this means low 
costs of hiring and firing the employees. At the same time, the state offers more generous 
unemployment benefits and intensively deploys active programs such as retraining and job search 
assistance for unemployed people. 
Chile introduced a mixed system of unemployment insurance in 2001 (Source: World Bank, 2012): The 
reform introduced the individual saving accounts underpinned with a risk-pooling safety net. The 
employers and workers are required to pay into accounts, and when workers leave or lose employment, 
they can draw on a specified portion their accumulated savings. Should a person’s job search extend 
longer than five months, they receive a defined minimum unemployment benefit (safety net). 
The best Slovak experience:  
Slovak flat-tax reform from 2003/04 (Source: Goliaš, 2005): 
• Unifying direct income taxes to 19% for individuals and businesses. The old system was strongly 
progressive with 5 personal income tax rates ranging from 10% for the lowest income to 38% for 
the highest income. The reform also decreased the corporate income tax rate from 25% to 19% 
and cancelled the dividend tax rate of 15%. The combined statutory corporate income tax rate 
and dividend tax rate dropped from 36.3% in 2003 to 19% in 2004. Thus, Slovakia had one of the 
lowest composite taxation of capital income faced by a private investor in the EU and OECD 
countries. 
• Increasing the indirect consumption taxes. In the old system there were two VAT rates: standard 
rate of 20% and reduced rate of 14%. The tax reform unified both and introduced a single VAT 
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rate of 19%. The tax reform included an increase in the excise tax rates on mineral oils, tobacco, 
and tobacco products, spirits and beer. 
• Radical simplification of the tax code. The old system included 90 exceptions, 19 sources of un-
taxed income, 66 tax-exempt items, and 37 items with specific tax rates. The reform virtually 
abolished all of them, making the tax system much simpler and transparent, and eliminated 
speculation aimed at paying lower tax rates. The reform also cancelled three minor taxes – gift 
tax, inheritance tax and real estate transfer tax. 
• Increasing the basic personal allowance deductible from the tax base from €968 to €2021 per 
taxpayer in 2004. As a consequence, everybody with wage below approximately half the average 
wage in the economy did not pay any income tax at all. Others pay a uniform tax of 19% on the 
difference between their income and the tax-free income. 
• Introducing tax bonuses for children deductible directly from the tax. As a result, working 
parents pay lower taxes or, with too low income, they get money back from the state – principle 
of “negative tax”. 
Slovak labor market reform from 2003 introduced more flexible Labor Code (Source: Goliaš, 2007): 
• The Code ordered to option between taking a notice period and taking compensation after 
termination of contract. It was not possible to take both the notice period and the 
compensation. The Code ordered 2-month notice period and 2-month compensation for 
employees who have been working with their employer for less than 5 years; and 3-month 
notice period and 3-month compensation for employees who have been working with their 
employer for over 5 years. These were the minimum limits valid if not agreed otherwise in a 
collective agreement. Thus, a termination of contract cost 2-month wages in case of 
employment lasting under 5 years and 3-month wages in case of employment over 5 years. 
• Increasing overtime limit from 150 hours to 400 hours yearly for one employer and with worker 
consent. Exceptions were possible for agricultural seasonal work. 
• Practically indefinite extension of the fixed-term contracts 
• Flexible termination of fixed-term and part-time contracts 
• Weaker Labor Unions: They lost veto power in organizational changes including firing the 
employees and introducing flexible work time.  
Besides these measures there are two other frequently used forms of flexible employment in Slovakia: 
• Working „agreements“: Concluded only for a limited time (1) per week for regular employment 
or (2) per year for irregular employment. These agreements offer flexible entry/exit and until 
2012 they were also freed from social security contributions. 
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• Agency work: Specialized agencies employ workers who are then hired by real producers. The 
agencies organize workers among many producers to minimize costs related to closing the job 
(such as severance payment, etc.). 
Here is also a more complex list of the best measures adopted in Slovakia. The measures are 
categorized into three different groups as proposed by Schneider (2010). 
Negative enforcement includes controls (e.g. onsite visits, tax audits), penalties (monetary, loss of state 
subsidies, up to forced closing of business), and new regulations (e.g. identification cards for 
construction workers, forced use of electronic payments, limits on cash transactions). The disadvantage 
is that the negative measures are unpopular and might reduce economic activity. 
List of measures: 
• 1994: Compulsory cash machines (disadvantage: before daily closing, it was still possible to 
remove data from the operational memory) 
• 2011-2012: Compulsory cash machines with fiscal memory that records identification 
information about the user and the machine as well as all performed transactions. It is 
impossible to erase recorded information. The fiscal memory is not available to the user (it is 
sealed by the Ministry of Finance) and it must be possible to read it from the PC. Penalties if 
fiscal memory is missing: €330-3,300 after the first control and €660-6,600 after the second 
control. Remaining problem: unrecorded transactions. 
• 2012: Ban for cash transactions over €5,000 
• Penalties €2-200 thousand for employing unregistered workers (depending on their number). 
Current proposal: Increasing lower band to €5 thousand. 
• Tax audits resulting in arrests and imprisonments (e.g. in 2013 a businessman who avoided 
paying VAT was sentenced to 11-year prison). 
Positive indirect enforcement proved to be most powerful: 
List of measures: 
Structural incentives (e.g. simplifying the tax and social benefit systems): 
• 2003: Labor market reform (see above) 
• 2003-2004: Flat-tax reform (see above) 
• 2004: Social benefits reform: Activation benefits for unemployed (part of social benefit is 
payable only upon providing limited work for public purposes) 
• 2005: Pension reform: Linking contributions to pension benefits 
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Increasing transparency and fight against corruption: 
• 1998-2002: Privatization of banks, telecom, energy (transparent international tenders) 
• 2000: Freedom of Information Act (focus on public sector contracts, no “trade secret” objection) 
• 2003: Online business registry (user-friendly, searchable) 
• 2004: Specialized Court and Prosecutor’s Office (focus on big corruption cases) 
• 2007: Online Land Registry 
• 2011: Publishing all property contracts and invoices of public institutions on internet. The 
contracts are not valid unless they are published. This measure means a shift from on-demand 
(i.e. based on information demanded by citizens) to automatic transparency. It allowed for 
creation of searchable portals displaying and comparing relevant information such as who were 
the biggest suppliers to the state, at what prices, etc. 
• 2011: Wider use of mandatory electronic auctions when public sector institutions purchase 
goods. According to the Transparency International Slovakia this measure led to rise of bids in 
public tenders and to 6-15% savings. 
• 2011: Wider use of competition methods in public procurement 
• 2012: Publishing court rulings on internet, public selection of judges 
Positive direct enforcement include for example introduction of vouchers or reduced value added tax 
(VAT) for household services, marketing campaigns, and incentives for electronic payment systems. 
List of measures: 
• Since 2002: Privatized banks are supporting electronic payments (internet banking, credit/debit 
cards, etc.) 
• 2013: Lottery with cash machines‘ bills (inspired by Taiwan) 
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3.4. Recommendations 
The World Bank (2012) emphasizes, that the fight against shadow economy is not all about enforcing 
laws and punishing offenders, but also about making the formal sector more attractive and changing 
social norms for paying taxes. Building trust in government is a key factor in convincing citizens paying 
taxes is useful. According to the World Bank (2012), “a good starting point is building good and 
trustworthy relationships between tax officials and taxpayers. (…) Improved and sustainable high levels 
of tax morale can only be achieved through a successful liaison of three factors: corruption control, the 
quality of institutions, and the degree of citizens’ participation.”  
States should also apply friendlier tax system coupled with a viable social and employment protection 
schemes. Here are key recommendations of the World Bank (2012): 
• Apply tax incentives for low-wage earners 
• „Smooth“ marginal effective tax rates (e.g. by introducing a flat tax) 
• Remove minor taxes (e.g. heritage, gift taxes) and minimize exemptions and loopholes 
• Shift taxes away from taxing labor earnings to value added tax or progressive real estate taxes 
• Integrate collection and auditing of taxes and social insurance contributions 
• Automate administrative processes and interactions between the tax authorities and taxpayers 
(e.g. electronic payments) 
• Design smart safety nets that reward formal work; any additional formal wage should increase 
net income, including benefits; the withdrawal of benefits has to be gradual 
• Adopt the “flexicurity” approach of protecting people rather than protecting jobs; balance the 
protection afforded to workers and consumers and the flexibility afforded to employers 
• Keep low ratio of minimum/average wages 
• Tie social insurance benefits closely to contributions (plans with primarily redistributive objective 
should be shifted to general taxation) 
• Provide free health insurance only to the poor people, based on a means-testing (alternative is a 
narrower definition of health coverage package) 
Additionally, we propose several more specific recommendations: 
• Contact Friedrich Schneider from the Johannes Kepler University in Linz, Austria and compute 
the actual size of the shadow economy in Moldova (most recent data is from 2006). 
• Initiate cooperation with the OECD and the World Bank in order to compute structural incentives 
indicators for Moldova. The indicators should include productivity of social insurance, 
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Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) index, tax wedge, formalization tax rate, and marginal 
effective tax rate. Where applicable, the indicators should be computed for different types of 
families (e.g. single/couple, number of children), different types of income (e.g. employment, 
self-employment) and different income levels. Based on the results, Moldova should introduce 
measures aimed at improving these indicators. 
• Reducing tax burden (including social insurance contributions) for low-earners is top priority 
measure especially in countries with low formal income (i.e. where the risk of absolute 
poverty is higher). Introduce measures aiming at decreasing the tax wedge as well as the 
formalization tax rates for low-earners. Take inspiration from the Hartz IV reform in Germany 
where monthly wages less than €400 are not subject to social insurance contributions and for 
monthly incomes between €401 and €800, the contribution rate rises gradually to the full share. 
• Make sure that it pays-off to work instead of taking social benefits. Social benefits should 
gradually decline as the working income rises. People working legally should have substantially 
higher net income than nonworking people living out only of social benefits. 
• Keep your tax system as simple as possible (remove exemptions and special tax rates) – take 
inspiration from the Slovak tax reform from 2003/04. 
• Keep low costs of dismissing employees (low severance payment and notice period) and support 
flexible forms of employment (e.g. flexible extension and termination of part-time and fixed-
term labor contracts) – take inspiration from the Slovak Labor market reform from 2003. This 
helps to create more legal jobs especially in seasonally sensitive sectors such as agriculture which 
creates around 16% of Moldovan GDP and employs more than 27% of employees (Mundi, 2013). 
• Build ethical and professional tax authority that is immune to bribing in tax collection/audit. 
Consider at least partial decentralization of income tax collection. Local municipalities have some 
information about the real income of taxpayers, which the central government does not have. 
They can recognize better than the central government who works in the shadow economy, to 
whom undeclared work serves as a sort of safety net and who is just a free rider. 
• Systematically reduce bureaucracy and support competitive environment; competitive banking 
industry would support and allow for spreading the electronic payments. 
• Apply mandatory use of cash machines with fiscal memories.  
• After reforming structural incentives, focus on repression measures more intensively (e.g. on-site 
visits and penalties for employing unregistered workers and/or un-declaring income, tax audits 
resulting in arrests and imprisonments, ban for cash transactions over certain threshold). 
• Build social capital, trust to politicians and government institutions. This is a long lasting process 
that requires increasing transparency in public spending, fighting corruption, and improving the 
quality of institutions and public benefits. As Jurzyca (2012) suggests: “Convince people that they 
should pay taxes. That it is moral, fair, that paying taxes is not a shame. Tax evasion should not 
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be national sport. It is not truth, that nobody pays taxes. See prisoner’s dilemma: if everybody 
believes that inflation will increase, it will increase, if everybody believes, that nobody pays taxes, 
almost nobody will pay them, if everybody believes, that all people are in shadow economy, 
almost all of them will enter it. The message is backed by emotions rather than numbers; it is to 
build a spirit of a society.”  
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